Xi: A Study in Power

"That’s right. This book’s central argument is that Xi Jinping, as an individual person, does not really count. It is the Chinese Communist Party that Xi represents, and to which he is a servant. This is Xi’s main purpose. Xi has centralised all those powers, but it’s not so much for himself; it’s for the party, and without the party he is nothing. That’s Brown’s main argument. I don’t fully agree with it, but I think it’s an important and interesting argument because, as you said, how can we study Xi Jinping without bringing the Chinese Communist Party into the picture? The issue is that because of the way in which Xi Jinping has personalised power and broken with party conventions—there are many party norms that he has completely violated—I would find it hard to argue that he is being constrained by the party or that he is the party’s servant. Especially since the beginning of his third term, in 2022, when he eliminated political rivals and the top echelon of the party is all his men, I don’t find that argument persuasive anymore. But it is an argument we can discuss, as in, ‘What is the relationship between the party and Xi Jinping himself?’ What if Xi came out and said he was no longer a member of the Chinese Communist Party, and formed his own party or was a non-party leader? Would that hold? I think obviously not. So Kerry is right in the sense that Xi Jinping’s legitimacy derives from being the powerful leader of that powerful organisation. It also means that whatever Xi Jinping does or does not do will always be measured by party conventions, by what the party used to do or used to believe. That idea will always be a constraining factor or benchmark for Xi Jinping’s performance. To answer that I would bring in my solo book, Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics , which really addresses that question in detail. China after Mao Zedong, even under Deng Xiaoping, was really a situation of factional power-sharing, of factional power balances and contestation of power. No single leader could monopolise all powers in their own hands. In my book, I went through some very major policy reforms in China under Deng Xiaoping and argued how uncertain it all was—how, quite often, those reforms nearly didn’t make it. When they did make it, there were a lot of political struggles, a lot of compromises, a lot of give and take, and a lot of concessions. All this showed that Deng Xiaoping really wasn’t that powerful: there were major political factions that he needed to respect, that he needed to consult, and that he needed to trade advantages with, in order to push through an agenda. Another important aspect is that the Chinese Communist Party isn’t just an organ of interests—we want to stay in power, we want to make ourselves rich—it’s also an organ of political ideas. This is something that we almost forget when we think about China because of how rich it has become, and how it seems like everyone is so focused on making money and making their lives better. Deng Xiaoping embodied that image. People are all about material profit and very little beyond that. It almost seems like they don’t believe in anything. They don’t believe in Mao; they don’t believe in socialism. Some people might have a religion, but they are a minority. So what do Chinese people believe in? I think, after the death of Mao Zedong, the conventional view of China is that it is in an ideological vacuum. What my solo book shows is that even within the party there are different ideologies, different political values, and they are all very much alive. Powerful party leaders use those values to debate with each other, to shape different policies, to try to undermine existing policies or existing narratives, to push through their own visions, and so on. There’s lively political debate, and that’s because there are many different ideas rather than because there are no ideas. That’s an important point to make. “The political, social, economic, and foreign policy changes he has made are profound” So there are two views of the Chinese Communist Party. One is that it doesn’t believe in anything, that it’s an ideological vacuum (which my solo book challenges). The other is that it believes in too many things, but they’re not united. There’s ideological diversity. Xi Jinping addresses both. Xi Jinping is about eliminating ideological diversity. He says that the main issue is that Chinese Communist Party members have lost their conviction in socialism. Whether they believe in various things or they don’t believe in anything, the main problem is that they don’t believe in what they should believe in, which is that socialism can save China, that Marxism works, and that China must persist in being a socialist country. The idea behind Xi Jinping Thought—the full name, which is rather clunky, is Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—is that socialism works because the powerful and visionary Xi Jinping can make socialism Chinese, can make it work for China. This is not the first time we’ve heard that. Mao Zedong said the same many years ago, that he was making socialism Chinese to make it work for China. After that, we had Deng Xiaoping, who focused much more on market reform. Now, Xi Jinping comes along and tries to sinicise socialism but in a different way, not in Mao Zedong’s way. Our book on Xi Jinping Thought is looking at what Xi Jinping thinks sinicising socialism means. To him, these are the guidelines (so to speak) to guide China to national rejuvenation and to fix the many problems that he thinks are holding back the party and holding back China if they are left unresolved."