Why Civil Resistance Works

"This book is an interesting analysis of a large number of cases where political struggles against incumbent governments took a violent form, and a large number of cases where non-violent methods were used. The authors have come to the conclusion – on the basis of these statistics and somewhat to their own surprise – that non-violent methods are, comparatively, more successful. Naturally, when one is confronted by statistics like that one has to ask deeper questions. For instance, is non-violent resistance adopted because the issue is perceived to be relatively easy or the adversary is perceived to be weak or lacking in support? They go into that sort of question to some extent, but I think there will be very interesting debate around this book about whether if you’d chosen a different lot of cases you would have come to another conclusion. They do take cases like that into account. They are not saying it always works – they are simply saying that statistically it is more likely to work. It is interesting what has been learned by advocates of non-violent struggle in the West. Many of them say that it was a mistake for protesters to hang on in Tiananmen Square after it became clear that the regime was not going to give in to any of their demands, and that the army was likely to be set loose on them. I think there’s something to that argument – there are times when tactical retreats are needed. But it’s problematic to make a generalisation about it. For example, in Tahrir Square earlier this year there was a serious attempt to get rid of the demonstrators. Horsemen and thugs on camels came into the square with every intention of attacking them. On that occasion the demonstrators resorted to a degree of violence to defend the square from these thugs, and that was the basis of their success in the revolution. So you can’t say that hanging onto a symbolic territory is necessarily the wrong decision. But it was probably the wrong decision in Tiananmen Square. One thing one can learn is that in politics, success is seldom permanent. Not even civil resistance can create paradise on Earth, or even a permanent sense of security. Also, sometimes there is a need to exert forms of pressure again in order to get the powers that be to revert to a greater degree of respect for democracy. But that’s not always easy. So one can argue that what’s happening in Tahrir Square now is very much of that sense of showing muscle – showing the army that there is a countervailing power in Egypt, and that they do not have a free ticket to do things just as they wish. There isn’t a one-size-fits-all answer to that question, and I’m very leery about doctrines that try to address it. Each case is significantly different, and outside support and activity can take many different forms. In relation to the Communist world, Western military intervention was quite out of the question, and in my view rightly so. But the carefully calibrated, American-led economic sanctions after the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981 arguably contributed to the eventual outcome – that is, both the lifting of martial law in 1983 and the elections of 1989 which led to the fall of the communist government. There were specific conditions which would enable the lifting of the sanctions, some of which had to do with releasing Solidarity [opposition] leaders from the detention in which they were being held. So that’s a case of external action that seems to have had some effect in the Communist world. Probably. I was not one of those who opposed the NATO military action in Libya. I thought that in the circumstances something had to be done. That something could, in effect, only be support for one side of the conflict – although it was presented as protection of civilians. But of course there’s the question: How do you protect civilians? Obviously, the best way to protect them is to see the defeat of the side that is most threatening to them. That is in effect what was done, with some modifications and restraints. But this is not a model that can be followed in many other places. There are huge risks in thinking that because you’ve intervened militarily in one place with reasonable success, you can do it elsewhere. That was the tragedy arising from the action over Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo was a necessary use of armed force to stop oppression – something like a third of the population had been forced to leave their homes, and there was a reasonable prospect of being able to stop that. But that gave rise to worrying views that you could intervene elsewhere – as in Iraq – if you were convinced of the morality of your cause."