In The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, Mr. Prados revisits the conflict by taking the reader behind conventional histories. Drawing from a broad range of sources and using new evidence, he focuses on key strategies, events, and personalities in the struggle. In narratives and vignettes that display his impressive command of facts and analysis, he sheds new light on the issues and punctures the popular mythologies of the war. The book explores the mysteries of the Tonkin Gulf, evaluates the quality of intelligence before Tet, profiles the influence of the Buddhists in the politics of South Vietnam, investigates the war of numbers over body counts, analyzes the failure of large-unit war, assesses the performance of air power - in short, Mr.…
"This is one of the best histories of Vietnam. As someone of the Vietnam generation, I’m addicted to the historiography of the war. This is a monumental book, stretching from 1945 to 1975. It addresses some of the misperceptions that have arisen over the years and clarifies that, despite some revisionist thinking, the United States never won. Despite massive firepower and 50,000 U.S. casualties – not to mention the two or three million Indochinese who lost their lives – the war was ongoing. It was not possible to defeat the insurgency militarily. It’s an important lesson. You can achieve tactical success here and there. But you can’t defeat an insurgency like the Viet Cong, which had deep roots and was capable of sustaining itself for many years. Yes – the same rules apply. They can suppress the Egyptian protesters by beating them up but the protesters are not going to go away. Only a political solution can address a relatively peaceful insurgency. That’s part of it. When your main tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. The United States spends a staggering amount of money on its military. When a problem arises, it’s the main solution. There’s also a cluster of economic, social and political interests that keep the military going. Then there are the basic human impulses. After 9/11 , there was a strong sense that we should take some sort of action. Bush’s war on terror seemed like a good thing to many Americans. It might have been a good political slogan. But it turns out that, as policy, the idea of waging war on terrorism is foolish, counterproductive and dangerous. The consistent lesson is that non-violent, non-military solutions are available. They don’t work every time, of course. But on most occasions, if we seriously utilise our non-violent tools, we can bring about a peaceful result and a freer and more democratic society."
