Smoke and Mirrors

"It is a matter of endless fascination for Indians and for Chinese and for others like myself to ask the great Chindia question: to what extent are these two countries similar and to what extent are they very different? Aiyar is a young Indian foreign correspondent based in Beijing. For me, it was fascinating to get a perspective on China from a non-Anglo Saxon and non-European perspective, yet from someone who is extraordinarily wedded to notions of Indian democracy and democracy in general. There is one particular observation in this book that I found particularly appealing, and that is the different interpretations of political accountability. It goes roughly along these lines: in India political parties derive their legitimacy from victory at the ballot box and Indian elections are a boisterous and at the same time a wonderfully vivacious and refreshing exercise of democratic will. The problems, she says, then start immediately, in fact the day after. Indian governments then put their feet up, many politicians are on the make and put their hands in the till. Meanwhile, delivery of the most basic public services only continues in the most desultory way. There is a pact between the Indian middle class and the business and political elite – the middle class pretty much opts out of everything in the public sector. Pretty much everything is only delivered to the rest of society. Whether it is your electric generator, your water supply, education, health, everything you get in the middle-class world is provided for you outside the state sector. And if anybody from the state gives you any hassle you just bribe them and they go away. Meanwhile you leave the politicians alone and they leave you alone and the country remains in the absolutely abject state it is in in terms of public service delivery to everyone else. Aiyar compares that with the fact that at the same time notionally, and constitutionally, India is an extremely healthy democracy. There are obviously flaws – there are flaws in free expression, issues such as newspapers quite openly mixing advertorial with news, the descent of so much of Indian media into covering B and C list Bollywood and cricket celebrity. You are quite pushed to find hard news stories in the mainstream media. But yes, it is still healthy and the most populous democracy in the world – which is a cause for celebration in such a disparate country with so many different ethnicities and so much potential for combustibility. She compares this version of legitimacy with China, where there are no elections, and the Chinese version of accountability is different. The ruling Chinese Communist Party has no democratic mandate, so it spends all its time seeking to produce the public services to keep a critical mass of the population sweet. In many ways it is the reverse of everything Indian. The Chinese pact is to keep the middle class and those that aspire to the middle class in increasing material comfort so that they don’t give the ruling party any hassle. That trade-off is at the heart of my book, and in a sense it is why the eight per cent growth target in 2009 at the height of the global financial crisis was so important. By fair means or foul, they had to make this target in order to keep the people confident that the country was continuing to grow – and all the predictions of social unrest faded away because the ruling elite managed to deliver material comfort. So hers is a very interesting analysis, and many of her points elided with my own theories about material comforts offsetting failures in democracy The key to controlling the message is controlling the internet: hence the Chinese being extremely exercised about what was appearing both before the Olympics and afterwards. And yet at the same time the Chinese have realised that you can’t turn the tap off completely – that’s the old ways of North Korea and Burma, it doesn’t work in a country of the size of China and it can’t work if you are seeking to ensure material comforts and to allow freedom of travel and all those sorts of things. This is the challenge of 21st century authoritarian states, which are different from 20th century totalitarian states. It’s a constant push-pull in China: what you get away with on a Tuesday might not be what you get away with on the Wednesday. The Chinese have a real middle-class obsession with golf, and they call this out-of-bounds markers: if you hit the ball out of bounds you have to start again. But these out-of-bounds markers are quite indiscernible: how do you tell when there are markers and when there are none, and who decides whether and where they are? So (and this is the Singapore model, too) it is perfectly fine to criticise corruption in your local council: ‘Why haven’t they collected my rubbish and why are the roads in such a bad state? It must be because someone is on the take.’ But it is absolutely not fine to name somebody and it is certainly not fine to criticise the national government. There is this constant push-pull and it is kept deliberately vague so that people self-censor. But yet it is utterly false to say that modern China is anything even resembling the Mao era. The conversations I had there were extremely candid and gossipy. People know roughly how far you can go but not clearly. Not necessarily, the markers can be put back again. There was an assumption that when they pulled back freedoms during the build-up to the Olympics people would be happy just to draw in for patriotic purposes, not to humiliate the country for those six weeks in the expectation that afterwards the authorities would loosen up again. But they didn’t, or only a little bit. So it is constantly changing. Part of this is deliberate and part of it is that the authorities themselves don’t know how far you can go. There is a great arbitrariness about punishment for dissent. It is psychologically clever but I don’t believe always deliberate. In my book I differentiate between private and public freedoms. Private freedom is the freedom to lead your life unencumbered by authority. You can speak as you want to in your own home, wear the clothes you wish, pursue your own private and sex life as you wish, educate your children where you wish, travel – basically you, your family and your friends, your atomised existence, you are left alone. The state doesn’t mess with you and in return you don’t enter into the public realm, you don’t mess with the state. You don’t publicly criticise, you don’t agitate, you don’t engage. The public freedoms are freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of conscience, political plurality. My thesis is that over the last 20 years of globalised consumption, the most important private freedom has become the freedom to make and spend your money. And the private freedoms have been elevated at the expense of public freedoms. In the West, we enjoy both, but the balance has just gone in one direction as we cede public freedoms. And I regard our culpability as great, because we have had both and we know both. In the former totalitarian states such as Russia and China it’s more understandable – if you are offered one thing, one thing is better than nothing. And if you were in China wearing Mao’s boiler suits and if you were in Russia and you could only travel as part of an official trade union delegation, then the idea that you can go on holiday to Cap Ferrat or to the beach in Turkey is extremely enticing, and if the price demanded for that is just to be cautious and not to slag off Putin or your local authorities, then that is a price most people are willing to pay. Because how many people do actually want to cause trouble or to engage with the public realm? It’s extremely few: journalists, lawyers, NGOs, activists, lawyers who agitate for them and defend them. It’s a tiny proportion – the vast majority just work in factories or offices and just want to get on with their life. Yes, there is a grey area, and these cases are the most interesting ones: whistle-blowing against corruption in an organisation, for example, where it isn’t necessarily anti-state, it is trying to improve accountability. But if you give people private freedoms, they are enormous and they matter a lot. You can have lunch with someone and take the mickey out of some prominent man and you are not going to be denounced, Stalin-style. It takes an active effort to enter into a public role, that’s the point; you are consciously doing it, not by accident. And it’s at that point that the state then seeks its redress."