Sectarianism in Syria's Civil War

"In the period between 1976 and 1982, a military offshoot of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood started killing Alawis. Their aim was to topple the regime and polarize Syria on a sectarian basis. This culminated in the massacre of Hama in 1982, where about 30,000 people were killed. It was, perhaps, another example of Sunni Islamists imagining they could win because they are the majority of the population. But being in the majority doesn’t mean anything when the real instruments of power are in the hands of people from the Alawi minority. From then on a civil war, or at least a reckoning, seemed inevitable. Just as it may be inevitable that in the future—it’s impossible to say when, of course—there might be a new uprising. There are so many people who do not want to be reconciled; they want to settle accounts because so many people are dead. “If I were a Syrian, I would not dare to go back. You don’t have any guarantee that you will be treated reasonably.” I chose Fabrice Balanche’s book because he is very clear about sectarianism. Sectarianism is played down by many, not only academics but also many people from Syria. They say it doesn’t play a role, or that the other side is sectarian but we are not. Many Sunnis and opposition people say the sectarian factor is not important to them, as far as their own motivations are concerned. But the dynamics of the conflict mean that sectarianism is bound to be important, because the instruments of power and repression are mainly, if not all, in the hands of Alawis. The elite units of the Syrian Arab Army, including the Republican Guard and the Tiger Forces, the security services and the pro-regime armed militias that have been established, like the Shabbiha, are all recognizably Alawi-dominated. They are not only Alawi, but most of the key people are. Although Balanche clearly recognizes that there are all kinds of other factors that are important, he stresses that the sectarian issue cannot be ignored. It’s a real factor. He demonstrates that by using explanatory maps. He shows how the opposition areas were mainly Sunni, whereas the non-opposition areas were mainly inhabited by minorities. It doesn’t mean that all these people are motivated by sectarianism, but hardly any defectors from the army were Alawis or from other minorities. Balanche is showing all this on the basis of solid facts and statistics. People may argue that it is an oversimplification to say that it is ‘Sunnis against Alawis’. It is a simplification indeed, but when it comes down to it, one of the most important things is who has the power, and these are Alawis. (One should not say ‘the’ Alawis, because many Alawis oppose the regime). When Balanche started his in-depth research in Syria in 1990, he already noticed that the country’s sectarian divisions were glaringly evident. The Alawi community was the backbone of Hafiz al-Assad’s classic patronage system: in exchange for political support, they were given material benefits that only increased their sectarian loyalty. The regime knew very well how to agitate the Islamist threat in order to strengthen Alawi loyalty. Yet this privileged relationship increasingly frustrated portions of the majority Sunni population, especially those who suffered deteriorating living conditions. As a result, civil war—Balanche noted—seemed inevitable in the long term. Support Five Books Five Books interviews are expensive to produce. If you're enjoying this interview, please support us by donating a small amount . From the beginning of the Syrian revolution, in 2011, Fabrice Balanche has been saying that the regime is very durable and could not be easily toppled. I was saying the same thing. This was at the stage of the conflict where the people predicting that Assad would have a long political life were accused of being pro-Assad—just because they said his chances of survival were high. Balanche was working at the time at the University of Lyon, but was reportedly disqualified for a senior job there just because his views on the possibilities for the survival of the Syrian regime— which turned out to be completely correct (!)—were disliked and rejected (based as this criticism was on wishful thinking). He is now working at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This book is available electronically, but I have a print version. I prefer that in terms of seeing all the 70 coloured maps and so on. Yes. His book clearly demonstrates sectarianism in a way that has not been done by anyone else, certainly not with detailed maps, showing demographic developments, sectarian changes, tribal and ethnic groups, military developments, refugees, changing population compositions in different cities, quarters, regions and so on. By the way, Balanche uses a wide definition of sectarianism, denoting not only religious communities, but also ethnic and tribal groups. ‘Sect’, in this book, is described as any social group whose members share a common identity and are able to create a strong solidarity link. ‘Sectarianism’, in this sense, therefore also includes ethnic groups, like the Kurds and Turkmens."