The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery

"Yes, this is a more traditional book of diplomatic and naval history than the other Kennedy book I mentioned, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It charts the rise of Great Britain as a major power – actually, in the early days it was England because it wasn’t called Great Britain until later. He looks at how, when and why this great power was able to essentially rule the world in the 19th century – how it was able to extend its reach on a global basis, attain mastery of the seas, and preserve a stable balance of power in Europe that enabled it to concentrate on the imperial periphery. Yes, very much so. Britain first rose economically when it became the workshop of the world and industrialised, and that growth gave it the potential to build a high seas fleet second to none. In fact, Britain was so superior economically that it adopted the Two Power Standard to set its fleet strength: the Royal Navy would remain as powerful as the next two most powerful fleets combined. And that is a level of superiority that is quite impressive especially at a time when other great powers were rising – as they were in the 19th century. I think that the book does a superb job of looking at the relationships between economic power and military power and mapping out in strategic terms how Britain went about translating its economic resources and its naval superiority into a level of global hegemony which is very rare in history. He focuses on a combination of two things – one is the secular rise of other powers. By the end of the 19th century the United States is turning on as a great power. Germany after its unification in 1871 is starting to become a major industrial power, generating steel and other war-making materials at a rate that soon catches up with the British. Japan is also industrialising and coming on line as a major power. And then, secondly, there is focus in the book on the sources of relative economic decline and its impact on strategy within the UK itself. One of the most interesting periods in the history of British grand strategy is the 1930s, when Britain’s sense of economic vulnerability delayed its rearmament and compelled the cabinet to avoid a continental commitment. In 1938 Chamberlain saw himself as having no choice but to appease Hitler because Britain did not have the capability to do otherwise. Economic constraints help explain the failure of Britain to balance against Nazi Germany."