Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America

"Operation Condor should be included in any discussion of state-sponsored assassination. There is a lot of choice of books that I could mention—Francesca Lessa at UCL just published an amazing book called The Condor Trials: Transnational Repression and Human Rights in South America — but I picked McSherry because, first of all, it was one of the earlier books on this topic. It relies on a lot of archival material. What I found particularly interesting was her discussion of state responsibility—she’s looking at the extent to which the United States can be understood as responsible for Condor. The argument is a very nuanced one; not blaming explicitly the United States. Condor was run primarily by military dictatorships within Latin American, with a protagonist role for Pinochet’s Chile, and to a certain extent Argentina. But it does say that the United States was such a powerful actor in Latin America, and that perhaps we need a broader understanding of state responsibility and involvement, which is also an argument I tried to make in my own book. “States who want to justify their policies end up adopting the same language as western states: they are ‘killing terrorists’” The United States, from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, provided ideological and ideational support. It prepared the ground. The US government basically worked to turn the militaries of Latin America states away from external threats and towards internal repression, playing a dominant position within domestic political life. For Condor, the US government also provided what McSherry calls ‘logistical support,’ so, the transfer of technology to Condor countries, the sale of weapons, the training of military officials, and the sharing of intelligence. Finally, there was direct participation or operational involvement. US personnel collaborated in abductions and interrogations, and Condor communications some went through systems within the US zone in Panama, for example. So there was a physical infrastructure through which the United States was involved, and which it could have completely cut off, but didn’t. Finally, one could argue that, at a higher level, there was a reluctance to call out and punish these countries for their behaviour, even when this behaviour proved reckless, such as with the assassination of Orlando Letelier—a former Minister in Salvador Allende’s government—in Washington DC. The United States almost always refused to exercise strong pressure in defence of human rights when dealing with the Condor countries. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went as far as to ignore the recommendations of US ambassadors in the field. No, I wouldn’t think so. I’m not the sort of harsh Realist that would argue there’s no space for morality in the conduct of foreign policy. I have no doubt that many of the people working in the US government at the time were driven primarily by moral and human rights concerns. But different people in the government work differently, I think. John Dinges, the investigative journalist, has written several books on Condor. He talked about a system where some members of the US government would give a ‘green light,’ or turn a blind eye to terrible activities—from torture to disappearance, extra-territorial assassinations, and so on. Others, at the same moments would give a ‘red light’ and express opposition. But of course, the actors involved only received the messages that they wanted to receive, especially if the green light was coming from someone higher up than a local ambassador or local authority."