The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?

"He really does, and he is still referred to. People ask his advice on Brexit and just about anything you can name, because he has an accumulated 30 years of being at the sharp end of all the legal tangles that dominate European politics. It’s a little book, published by Cambridge University Press. In a way, it’s more of a booklet, but the reason I chose it is that it puts its finger right on the big problem: what are we going to do about these very different countries that have been brought into what was a homogenous organisation or structure, and is now very heterogeneous? The message Jean-Claude is trying to get over is that we need a two-speed arrangement. We need much more flexibility. He thinks that the EU’s problems are becoming very acute, and the only way to face them, the only way to address reform, is by having a core of countries—probably with France and Germany at the head—and streamlining the way the EU works. He thinks that trying to do it all in one go, with all 27 countries, even with the British going, won’t resolve the problem. He thinks it’s unrealistic to imagine that you can have a sweeping reform of all those countries. So he says, ‘Let’s first of all reduce some of the EU’s ambitions. Secondly, let’s have an inner core of continental, western European countries working together.’ This isn’t new, of course. Jean-Claude Piris wrote his book five years ago, in fact. Although he is a very influential voice, it has to be said that in five years it hasn’t made a lot of difference to the debate. The Euro-populist pressures that we now see didn’t even exist five years ago. The idea of splitting the EU into two or even three speeds hasn’t gained much traction. The reason for that is that it is difficult with so much volatility in national politics. It is as difficult to get people to agree to a two-speed Europe as it is to agree to an overall reform package. The awful truth of it is that European governments—because of the way their electorates have become so Eurosceptic— are in no mood to take any real decisions. All possibilities look like bad news for governments that are in office. It’s the old saying, ‘When in doubt, say nowt.’ Nothing happens at the moment, so we’re into an awful stasis of European politics. His book is very cogent, very well thought out, better informed on what’s going on than anybody else I can think of. But it’s not moving forward and we’re not moving forward with his ideas. That’s exactly the right question. I often think that European politics is like three-dimensional chess. There are so many different levels. The first problem is that we continue to have two sides: the converted and the infidel (or the heathen). The converted believe no matter what, European unity and European progress is the only solution. We need more Europe. Then there are the doubters who say, ‘No, look, it’s the people of Europe. The voters don’t want it. It’s useless to pursue it, so forget it.’ “The British civil service is famous amongst the Europeans for what is known as ‘gold plating.’ They take something that’s been agreed at a European level and make it bigger and more prominent than it was ever meant to be.” Brussels is made up of officials who are true believers, the high priests of European integration. But like for so many priests, the congregation is a bit restless. So that’s one level. The second level is the governments themselves. Different countries have different priorities: northern Europe worries, in security terms, about Russia. Southern Europe worries about the Arab world and Africa. And so on and so forth. Then, there are the ex-communists who believe that they only escaped the shackles of the Soviet Empire to be free, and now Brussels is coming with a new set of handcuffs. It’s very difficult to find any sort of consensus in this array of different priorities, different political motivations. So the short answer is no, there is no consensus at all, and it’s very hard to see one emerging. The only catalyst I can see is a real shock to the system; something that will bang heads together so we can say, ‘We’re squabbling about minor details. The big issue is our place in the world, how we handle China and India in 10, 15, 20 years’ time.’ Now, what that shock might be, I don’t know. I thought that the economic crisis was going to be a catalyst. I even thought that Brexit was going to be a catalyst. But right now, I can’t see what a shock would be that would get people to realise that they’re arguing over details, not fundamentals. It’s turned out to be counterproductive. The Brexiteers thought that once Great Britain left the EU, others would follow suit. In fact, what’s happened is the others have looked at the incredible tangle that EU membership creates over time and have all decided, ‘No, we don’t want to do that.’ In some sense, there’s great solidarity, much more than the Brexiteers thought. But, at the same time, the consensus still eludes them. Somehow we’re stuck between those extremes."