The Empirical Stance

"This book was van Fraassens’s Terry Lectures that he gave at Yale in 1999. These lectures are often devoted to topics of science and religion. What I like about this book is that very few philosophers of science have been that interested in the science-religion questions, and here we have one of the leading analytic philosophers of science attempting to grapple with those questions in a very sophisticated way. One of his targets is this strong version of naturalism or physicalism or materialism which is associated with Australian analytic philosophy—with Jack Smart and David Armstrong. He sees these guys and others as trying to mould philosophy into the image of science, as attempting to hold beliefs that lead to an implicit metaphysics. As the title of the book suggests, what he thinks philosophers of science should have is not a set of beliefs and metaphysical commitments, but rather a “stance”. For him, a stance is less dogmatic and restrictive. Take empiricism, for example: instead of focusing on the content and metaphysics of science, you look at its procedures and how it generates knowledge. I think that is a much more fruitful way for philosophers to think about science, rather than postulating normative claims about what its commitments or procedures ought to be. They should observe what’s going and see how science is constructed. This is why, interestingly, he’s somewhat sympathetic to philosophers like Paul Feyerabend who are usually seen as quite radical and relativist. Feyerabend’s famous claim is that there’s no scientific method and that ‘anything goes’. What he means by that is that if you actually look at scientific practices, you see that scientists will do whatever it takes to get the outcomes. What you won’t find is a set of tightly defined and prescriptive methods that they operate with. As a historian, I’m very sympathetic to that view, because that’s essentially what historians do. They want to look at how it is that people come to generate knowledge in real life, without dictating what the process should be. I think van Fraassen’s worry is that naturalism is a commitment that we don’t have to make. It’s not required for the success of science. The question is what the minimal things are that we need for a successful science. We understand science to be an empirical activity—scientists work in the realm of appearances. By way of contrast, claiming to know what lies behind the appearances can lead to a problematic and dogmatic metaphysics. For van Fraassen, the dominant naturalist metaphysics is one that leaves no room for human beings in our picture of the world. What will follow from that is a position that leaves religious and moral considerations out of the picture. He wants to have an understanding of the operation of science but in a way that we still have a view of the world that can still accommodate us, and along with that, ultimately, a religious dimension. The question goes to what the connection is between methodological naturalism—the stance we adopt when we do science and that excludes supernatural explanations—and the more powerful claim that naturalistic explanations are the only ones that there are, or should be. In my view, it’s illegitimate to claim that methodological naturalism entails metaphysical naturalism. There are some interesting arguments that attempt to link those together, but I don’t find them persuasive. But neither should we deny the great power of the naturalistic stance. As you say, the existence of Christian scientists who are not obviously subject to cognitive dissonance is an embarrassment for some who would claim the incompatibility of science and religion (as, for example, the New Atheists did). The fact is that there are now eminent scientists who have religious commitments, as there have always been throughout history. This is an awkward fact for advocates of the incompatibility of science and religion That’s interesting. One thing that the Galileo Affair has taught the Catholic Church is that it’s not wise to meddle in the scientific realm—that there shouldn’t be religious interference in scientific activity. I think that lesson has been learned. For me, there is the nagging question of the legitimacy of modern science and whether it needs external sets of values to support it. Although it may now seem to be largely self-sustaining in terms of the technology it generates and the knowledge it gives us, there’s a question of whether science is sustainable without a set of cultural values that support its mission. If you think about climate change scepticism, anti-vaxxers, and to some extent young-earth creationism, there are forces arrayed against it. “One thing that the Galileo Affair has taught the Catholic Church is that it’s not wise to meddle in the scientific realm” Also, government instrumentalities seem to be increasingly less willing to fund blue skies research—curiosity-driven science—and they are far more interested in specific applications. I think that’s a long-term danger to a science that sees itself exploring questions of genuine interest as opposed to just being involved in busy work to produce widgets for people who want better iPhones and so on. A better example would be improvements in health. This is not a particularly happy note to end on, but I think that if we’re too utilitarian in our approach to science—and this goes to questions of intrinsic value as opposed to utility—this could kill off genuine scientific inquiry in the long term."