The Dutch Revolt

"It still is the standard text. There is a Dutch book, which has been translated into English, but I still think this is the go-to text. One of the reasons, maybe the most important, is that Geoffrey came to this from the Spanish side. He was not originally a historian of the Netherlands. He was a historian of Spain and the Spanish colonial empire—like Jonathan Israel, by the way—who then became interested in Dutch history, learned the language, and was able to look at the story from both sides. Another important aspect of the book is that he looks at the Low Countries—and not at Belgium or the Netherlands—because the great majority of texts about this episode are written from some sort of national perspective, with the authors trying to explore the origins of the country they live in. Parker is interested in this as a part of European history. And the fact that it all happens in the Low Countries is secondary to that larger interest. “Even at the beginning of the 19th century, the Netherlands was the richest country in the world on a per capita basis” The other aspect that is very new and fundamental is that he sees this as part of a bigger struggle for hegemony not only in Europe, but also on the world stage. So, the whole story in his book is embedded in that larger global and European framework. And that framework is military. Traditionally, the story of the Dutch Revolt is told as a story about religious toleration and national freedom and independence. That’s not what Parker is interested in. He is primarily interested in why the Dutch were able to win a conflict where they were so obviously the underdogs, and where Spain was the equivalent of the United States in the 16th century, the world’s great military power. This is really a story like Vietnam fighting the United States in the 1970s, and winning against all the odds. The core message of the book is that the Dutch didn’t win, Spain lost. Spain had interests around the globe. For the Dutch, this was the only show in town, this was the conflict into which they threw all their resources. But for the King of Spain, this was one of a handful or even a dozen conflicts that were demanding his attention all the time and, more importantly, that required financial commitments. Parker describes an army that, in itself, was capable of achieving a lot, but was structurally underfunded. So all the time they win battles and sieges and so on, and then they give up the gains because the money runs out. Either they can’t afford to go on or—more likely, and another discovery of Parker’s work—the Spanish soldiers mutiny. They give up their conquests and go after money because they are structurally underpaid. In the process, they upset a great number of citizens—loyal Catholic citizens—in the Low Countries who support the King of Spain’s overall programme, but who hate the way he is trying to achieve his objectives. The rebels don’t have that many supporters in general, but their support is increased by the way that Spain and its officials and soldiers go about their business in the Low Countries. That’s what creates support. Absolutely, the bloody way Alba goes about the business, but also the way he rides roughshod over existing procedures, legislation, and political traditions. All of that is ignored in an overall attempt to suppress the Revolt. People just didn’t like that. The parallel with Vietnam is obvious because most Vietnamese were not Communists. But the way they were treated by the regime in Saigon and by American soldiers pushed them into the arms of the other party. No, that’s not really a topic of the book. There are more technical works of economic history that do that, but they are not as accessible as this one."